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Abstract 
 
An impressive amount of studies points to the impact of political and institutional characteristics on 
a community‟s fiscal policy. Most of the time, these characteristics are studied in isolation : possible 
interactions with other political determinants are ignored. Yet, fiscal policy decisions are subject to 
political and institutional forces contemporaneously. In this paper, we join different models, while 
explaining simultaneously the variation in the Flemish local income tax rate and the local 
property tax rate using an extended dataset covering 3 local elections. When confronting the 
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results of the separate analyses with those of the joint analysis, we conclude that isolated testing 
suffers from specification bias. 
 
1. Introduction 
  
The way in which a government determines its tax rates and why policymakers change them has 
been studied before. Tax smoothing theory states that an efficient government fixes tax rates in 
a way that minimizes the costs of taxation over time. Consequently, governments will not adjust 
tax rates to temporary changes in expenditures or revenues and the planned tax rate is expected 
to be constant over time. Barro (1979) exploited this theory to explain the existence of 
surpluses and deficits. However, empirical evidence (e.g. Strazicich, 1997) shows that tax rates 
are not constant over time and refutes tax smoothing theory. Governments do change tax rates 
and various motivations have been suggested. Hettich & Winer (1984, 1988, 1999 & 2002) 
provide a theoretical framework for tax choices. They conclude that “tax systems can be viewed 
as the outcome of optimizing political and economic behavior” (Hettich & Winer, 1988; 711). 
The Hettich & Winer model assumes that the maximization of support for the government is 
the main objective when outlining fiscal policy. The probability that an individual votes for the 
governing party depends positively on the public services provided and negatively on the voter‟s 
income loss due to taxation. Both the level of public services and the tax policy differ according 
to the partisan characteristics of the government. Theories on partisan politics attribute central 
importance to the ideological differences between groups within society and the parties that 
represent these groups (Tufte, 1978). Next to partisan influences, other theories focus on 
politically inspired determinants of tax rates. The political budget cycle theory points to the 
impact of the timing of elections on tax rates (Franzese, 2002). Fragmentation and tax 
interaction theories show that, respectively, the composition of the government (Ricciuti, 2004) 
and the fiscal policy of neighbouring jurisdictions (Besley & Case, 1995) frame tax policy as 
well. Finally, fiscal illusion effects may explain the level of tax rates. Fiscal illusion refers to 
features of the tax system that result in an underestimation of the taxpayers‟ tax burden or the 
tax price for the provision of public goods (Buchanan, 1967). 
 
The number of surveys that empirically investigate one of the above determinants is impressive. 
Separately focusing on one feature permits a more detailed analysis of that individual 
determinant, but leaves the question unanswered how they are mutually related. The question 
whether tax rate determinants also explain tax rates significantly when they are tested jointly 
remains empirically unanswered. The purpose of this paper is to test such an integrated model 
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that takes into account these theories mutually, which has –as far as we know– not been 
attempted before. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 elucidates its focus and provides 
some contributions to the existing research. Section 3 reviews the literature on individual tax 
rate determinants and formulates some hypotheses. The empirical analysis is clarified in section 
4, while the main findings are summarized in section 5. 
 
2. Discussion 
 
Attention to individual fiscal policy determinants has grown gradually. The concept of fiscal 
illusion was introduced by Puviani as early as 1903 but empirical literature on fiscal illusion has  
its origin in the mid 1970s. Also at that time Nordhaus (1975) formulated the political business 
cycle theory. Shortly after, Hibbs (1977), followed by Tufte (1978), introduced the idea that the 
ideological differences of parties may play an important role in shaping public policy. Frey & 
Schneider (1978a & 1978b) believe that ideological motives mark the chosen policy. Since the 
mid 1980s, starting with Zodrow & Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986), there has been an 
outpouring of academic research on tax competition, building on Oates‟ (1972) attempt to 
understand the potential efficiency problems associated with competition for capital. At the end 
of the 1980s, Roubini & Sachs (1989a & 1989b) introduced the idea that public policy is also 
affected by the level of government fragmentation. Ever since these seminal papers, each 
individual model has been intensively tested empirically on different types of datasets. The first 
contribution of this paper to this enormous literature is that our model tests the theories jointly.  
 
Secondly, in this paper tax rates are estimated. Most of the papers focus on tax revenues or tax 
revenues as a share of GDP.2 However, tax revenues information may be a less accurate 
reflection of elected officials‟ intentions, as taxes paid may also reflect economic conditions of 
which the politician was unaware. Therefore, we explain tax rates in stead of tax revenues (as 
share of GDP). In particular we explain the Flemish local income tax rate and the local property 
tax rate. Both taxes are surcharge taxes, the rates of which are the local government‟s 
sovereignty. All municipalities are held to use the same definition of the tax base, which is 
undoubtedly an advantage from an empirical point of view.  
 
                                               
2  See e.g. Poterba (1994), Yoo (1998), Bizer & Durlauf (1990) and van der Ploeg (1990). 
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The local context in which we test our hypotheses is another contribution to the empirical 
research on tax rate determinants. Research on the determinants of tax rates at the municipal 
level is not that widespread. To the best of our knowledge only Allers & Elhorst (2005), 
Bastiaens et al. (2001), Bordignon et al. (2003), Brett & Pinkse (2000), Brueckner & Saavedra 
(2001), Buettner (2001), Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998), Leprince et al. (2007), Richard et al. 
(2005), Solé Ollé (2003) and Van Parys & Verbeke (2007) investigate tax rate determinants at 
the local level. Tax rate determinants at higher government levels on the contrary have been 
examined extensively.3  
 
Fourthly, we estimate both local tax rates simultaneously. Governments decide on both tax rates 
in the same period and within the same (economic, political as social) context. Moreover, 
governments consider the one tax rate when setting the other and vice versa. This is not 
unimportant in our context. We recognize the methodological impact of this feature of the local 
Flemish tax rate policy by introducing a simultaneous estimation approach.  
 
Finally, our dataset covers 15 years and contains 3 election moments. With this, our dataset 
presents the longest time series so far used to explain local tax rate policy.4 Longer time series 
may lead to more accurate estimators, especially when the political budget cycle theory is tested. 
The more terms the time series contain, the stronger the evidence that elections may or may not 
affect fiscal policy term after term.  
 
3. The literature on tax rate determinants 
 
This paper explains simultaneously the local income tax rate and the local property tax rate of 
Flemish municipalities. We focus on political forces, while economic forces are introduced in the 
analyses as control variables. This is in line with the Hettich & Winer (1984, 1988, 1999 & 2002) 
tax structure model that explains fiscal choices and fiscal policies as equilibrium outcomes of a 
collective choice process that is constrained by political as well as economic forces. The Hettich 
& Winer tax structure model thus assigns an explicit role to the political process when analysing 
fiscal policy. It states that “a full understanding of taxation also requires [the] examination of the 
process by which tax structure is determined” (Hettich & Winer, 1999; 2). The authors 
                                               
3  Only some of the authors that examined tax rate determinants at higher government levels are Besley & Case 
(1995), Besley & Rosen (1998), Case (1993), Esteller-Moré & Solé Ollé (2001), Feld & Reulier (2005), Goodspeed 
(2000), Hayashi & Boadway (2001), Hernández-Murillo (2003), Rork (2003) and Strazicich (2001).  
4  See Goeminne (2009) for an overview of research on local inhabitant tax rate determinants (Table A2, p. 196-198) 
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themselves suggest some of these political determinants and e.g. refer to the role of elections, the 
role of governance and the structural features of revenue systems. Therefore in the following of 
this paper we focus on political forces that may explain the level of tax rates. We formulate a 
number of testable hypotheses concerning the factors, ceteris paribus, affecting local tax rate 
policy.  
 
A large literature has examined whether the composition of the government affects fiscal 
policy. Mostly partisan or fragmentation characteristics have been the subjects of research, but 
the power of the government –mostly measured by an electoral margin variable– has also been 
studied. Partisan characteristics measure for the impact of ideological differences on policy 
outputs. Imbeau et al. (2001) overview the mainstream studies on partisan influences on policy 
outcome and explicitly state that “changes in the left-right party composition of a government 
are hypothesized to be related to changes in policy”. According to fiscal policy theory left-wing 
governments are more in favour of income redistribution and an active state than right-wing 
governments. This may lead to higher public expenditures (Hibbs, 1977 and Schmidt, 1996) 
resulting in higher tax rates. Leftist governments are thus expected to have a positive effect on 
tax rates, while the opposite is true for rightist governments. At the local level, the partisan 
hypothesis is confirmed by Solé Ollé (2003). As a result we shall test whether:  
 
H1 : Leftist governments impose higher tax rates 
 
Other scholars suggest that more fragmented (or divided) governments increase public 
spending which is reflected in a higher tax burden as several conflicting political objectives 
have to be reconciled. This idea originates from Roubini & Sachs‟ (1989a,b) Weak Government 
Hypothesis that states that more fragmented governments tend to follow less restrictive fiscal 
policies.5 As shown in Volkerink & de Haan (2001) and Ricciuti (2004) fragmentation leads to 
higher levels of expenditure. Consequently we expect higher tax rates for weaker governments. 
Therefore we test the next hypothesis:  
 
H2 : More fragmented governments levy higher tax rates 
 
Since Frey & Schneider (1978a) it is well-established that budgetary policy is affected by the 
incumbents‟ electoral margin. The higher the electoral margin of the government, the less it 
needs to engage in opportunistic fiscal behavior because it is relatively confident of re-election, 
                                               
5  For a review see Ashworth et al. (2005). 
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regardless of its tax setting behavior. It thus does not have to care much about the loss of votes 
resulting from high tax rates. Solé Ollé (2003) and Allers & Elhorst (2005) show that fiscal 
policy depends on the electoral margin in Spanish and Dutch municipalities respectively. We 
hypothesize that: 
 
H3 : Governments with a large majority impose higher tax rates 
 
Fiscal policy decisions of a government may be influenced by the fiscal policy decisions of 
neighbouring jurisdictions as a result of yardstick competition.6 Traditionally, the fiscal policy 
literature distinguishes two types of yardstick competition : tax mimicking and tax competition. 
Tax mimicking theory shows that incumbents are likely to mimic the tax-setting of 
neighbouring governments. This is because voters are expected to use the fiscal policy of a 
neighbouring government as a yardstick to evaluate that of their own government when 
deciding whether or not to re-elect the incumbent government (Besley & Case, 1995). Heyndels 
& Vuchelen (1998) and Richard et al. (2005), Allers & Elhorst (2005) and Solé Ollé (2003) bring 
forward evidence of tax mimicking behavior in Belgian, Dutch and Spanish municipalities. Tax 
competition theory suggests that the mobility of the tax base leads governments to adopt lower 
tax rates in order to attract part of the tax base from other jurisdictions (Zodrow & 
Mieszkowski, 1986). This competition can lead to tax rates so low that this results in the 
insufficient provision of public goods. This evolution is known in the literature as the “race to 
the bottom”. Although tax competition is well described in the literature (see Wilson, 1999), 
empirical evidence at the municipal level is scarce. We can only refer to Van Parys & Verbeke 
(2007) and Brueckner & Saavedra (2001) who show evidence of tax competition in Belgian 
municipalities and the Boston metropolitan area respectively. The theory of yardstick 
competition suggest that fiscal policy may be influenced by that of the neighbouring 
jurisdictions, so we investigate the meaning of hypothesis 4: 
 
H4 : Tax rates interact with neighbouring tax rates 
 
Whether or not governments change fiscal policy at elections is the central focus of electoral 
cycle models. To name some, Bizer & Durlauf (1990), Poterba (1994) and Tufte (1978) provide 
evidence that politicians manipulate tax levels for electoral purposes. The theoretical 
expectation is that tax rate reductions (increases) or the abolition (introduction) of (new) taxes 
increase (decrease) the popularity of the government. Lowering taxes –and correspondingly  
                                               
6  See Brueckner (2003) and Revelli (2005) for an overview of empirical models of strategic interaction that give rise to 
a spatial pattern in local government expenditures and revenues. 
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increasing expenditures or raising grants– before elections raises the government‟s probability 
of re-election. The existence of political budget cycles at the local level is shown by e.g. 
Ashworth et al. (2005 & 2006), Binet & Pentecôte (2004), Brender (2003), Drazen & Eslava 
(2005), Geys (2007) and Veiga & Veiga (2007). Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) provide evidence 
that in Flemish municipalities lower tax rates do indeed have a positive impact on electoral 
outcomes. We therefore test hypothesis 5: 
 
H5 : Tax rates increase in post-election years and decrease when elections are near  
 
Fiscal illusion refers to the voter‟s systematically biased perception of fiscal parameters. This 
misperception is related to the way the government raises revenues. Fiscal illusion allows the 
government to raise tax revenue while minimizing voters‟ resistance. The literature discerns 
various types of fiscal illusion. First, the flypaper effect (or grant illusion) refers to the expenditure 
stimulus resulting from unconditional grants (Courant et al., 1979). A second source of fiscal 
illusion is related to the elasticity of tax receipts. It stresses the difference between discretionary and 
automatic tax increases (Oates, 1975). Tax income growth due to the automatic responsiveness 
of the tax system to changes in economic activity remains invisible for the taxpayer, while 
changes in fiscal revenue due to a political action are highly visible. Higher levels of expenditure 
will be the result of automatic tax increases of which the political costs will be minimized. A 
third type of fiscal illusion can be found in the complexity of the tax structure. It may be difficult for 
voters to know the total amount of taxes paid when the tax structure is complex. Numerous 
small taxes rather than a few significant ones make it difficult for the taxpayer to identify the 
cost of government and thus may create illusionary effects (Heyndels & Smolders, 1994). 
Finally, renter illusion exists when  taxation is significantly property based. Most property tax 
systems tax property owners, not occupants, so that only property owners are likely to perceive 
correctly the tax price. Renters underestimate their true tax price as they forget that (a part of) 
the property tax is shifted to them through the rent they pay. This explains why renters accept 
more easily higher levels of local expenditure (Blom-Hansen, 2005). Evidence of fiscal illusion 
at the local level is present in Dollery & Worthington (1999), Gemmell et al. (2002), Heyndels & 
Smolders (1994), Pommerehne & Schneider (1978) and Winter & Mouritzen (2001). These 
authors investigated “full” fiscal illusion models, while others look for evidence of only one of 
the four sources of fiscal illusion. We refer to Barnett et al. (1991), Beck (1984), Bergstrom & 
Goodman (1973), Blom-Hansen (2005), DiLorenzo (1982), Heyndels (2001) and Heyndels & 
Smolders (1995). Though fiscal illusion models are used to explain higher expenditure levels, 
they can also be used  to explain the level of tax rates, as Bastiaens et al. (2001) confirm. Therefore 
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we expect higher tax rates when fiscal illusion is present and formulate the following (sub-
)hypotheses to take  into account the different types of fiscal illusion :   
 
H6.1 : The presence of grant illusion positively affects tax rates 
H6.2 : The elasticity of the tax receipts positively affects the tax rates 
H6.3 : The more complex the tax structure, the higher the tax rates 
H6.4 : The presence of renter illusion positively affects tax rates 
  
4. Empirical analysis 
 
To empirically test the hypotheses formulated in the previous section, we use a dataset of 308 
Flemish municipalities for the period 1992-2006. Section 4.1 clarifies the Flemish institutional 
background. Section 4.2 introduces our dependent variables. Section 4.3 provides a detailed 
account of the model‟s specification and the measurement of our variables. Section 4.4 points 
to the methodology and section 4.5 finally presents the empirical results. 
 
4.1 Flemish municipalities 
 
Before turning to the analyses, we‟d like to familiarize the unacquainted reader with some of the 
financial and institutional characteristics of Flemish municipalities. The governments of the 308 
Flemish municipalities have wide-ranging budgetary and fiscal autonomy. They are authorized 
to decide independently on the level and the structure of expenditures and revenues. Taxation, 
the focal point of this paper, generates a little less than half of the Flemish municipalities‟ 
revenues. Most important taxes are the local income and local property tax. These taxes are 
surcharge taxes and will be the dependent variables in our analysis.7 Besides those surcharge 
taxes, municipalities also collect local taxes for which they themselves set the tax base as well as 
the tax rate. As in most decentralised countries, local governments in Flanders depend on 
higher levels of government for their revenue. Grants from higher governments (which are for 
the most part unconditional) are almost equal in importance to taxation in local governments‟ 
revenues.  
 
Flemish local governments have a parliamentary system consisting of the local Council (the 
legislative body) and the College of Mayor and Alderman (the executive body). Seats in the 
Council are allocated using a system of proportional representation. The College is elected from 
the members of the Council. Its composition is determined by the party (or parties) holding a 
                                               
7  For more details on the local income tax rate and local property tax rate, see section 4.2. 
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majority position in the Council. The number of parties in the majority differ between 1 and 5 
as shown in Table A1 in appendix on p. 22.  
 
4.2 Dependent variables 
 
The dependent variables of the analysis, LITR and LPTR, represent the local income tax rate 
and the local property tax rate. Over four fifths of the local governments‟ tax income derives 
from these taxes. Both taxes are single rate surcharge taxes on the federal income tax and the 
regional property tax respectively. Higher governments define both tax bases while the local 
Councils are free to set the tax rate (including 0). LITR is set by the municipality as a percentage 
of the tax due by the taxpayer to the federal authority. LPTR is expressed as a number of 
hundredths –or centimes– of the regional tax rate. In the period under study, the average local 
tax rates were 6.82% and 1127 centimes. In 1992, the first year of our dataset, the average tax 
rates were 6.66% and 964 centimes. In 2006, the last year of dataset, they were 7.12% and 1297 
centimes. Both average local tax rates present a slight upward trend in the period in between.  
 
4.3 Empirical model 
 
We estimate the following system of equations (I.) to test our hypotheses (subscripts i and t 
referring to municipalities and time respectively): 
 
(I.) LITRit =  1 + 2 POLit-1 + 3 INTERit + 4 TBEit + 5 ILLUSit + 6 LPTRit          
+ 7 DEMOit-1 + 8 TBASEit-1 + 9 TDEPit-1 + 10 DEBTit-1                  
+ 11 TRENDt + uit 
 LPTRit =  1 + 2 POLit-1 + 3 INTERit + 4 TBEit + 5 ILLUSit + 6 LITRit          
+ 7 DEMOit-1 + 8 TBASEit-1 + 9 TDEPit-1 + 10 DEBTit-1                    
+ 11 TRENDt + vit 
 
The dependent variables LITR and LPTR represent the local income tax rate and the local 
property tax rate.  
 
POL is a vector of political variables, containing partisan and fragmentation characteristics, as 
well as a variable taking into account the political strength of the government.8 To test hypothesis 
1, that is the impact of partisan characteristics on the local tax rates, we introduce the 
                                               
8  All political variables are fixed over the legislature and measured at the time of the previous elections.  
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Ideological Complexion of the Government (ICG) index as developed by Kontopoulos & 
Perotti (1999) and used previously in research on Flemish municipalities by Ashworth et al. 
(2006) and Geys (2007). ICG takes into account the ideological position of the government and 
positions the government on a left-right scale with 0 representing extreme left and 10 
representing extreme right. ICG is a weighted average of the ideological scores of the individual 
government parties (as shown in Table A2 on p. 22), where the weight is the relative number of 
mayor and/or aldermen of a certain party in the government. Presuming that leftist 
governments levy higher tax rates, the expected value of ICG is negative. Hypothesis 2 stated that 
fragmented governments are expected to levy higher tax rates. We add the number of parties of 
the current government (NPAR) to measure the effect of fragmentation. As Ashworth et al. (2005 
& 2006), Geys (2007) and Goeminne et al. (2008) have previously found a non-linear effect of 
government fragmentation on Flemish local government‟s fiscal decision-making, we also test a 
non linear specification, adding a squared term of NPAR. The seats margin (SEATMAR) 
measures the strength of the government. It is computed as the difference between the 
percentage of the seats of the government parties in the Council and 50%. Hypothesis 3 predicts 
that tax rates increase with SEATMAR, thus a positive value is expected.  
 
INTER is a vector of spatial tax interaction variables. Like Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998) and Van 
Parys & Verbeke (2007) the average tax rates of the neighbouring jurisdictions (LITRN and 
LPTRN) are added to the model to test hypothesis 4.9 Both the empirical literature on tax 
mimicking and that on tax competition use the average tax rates of neighbouring municipalities to 
measure for the existence of tax mimicking or tax competition. This implies that it will be 
impracticable to distinguish between the tax mimic and tax competition effect, or thus we look 
for evidence of yardstick competition.10 Traditionally yardstick competition theories test whether 
a policy instrument of a jurisdiction is significantly affected by the same policy instrument in 
competing jurisdictions, a so-called “within policy interaction”. Nevertheless, a “cross policy 
interaction” is possible. This occurs when a jurisdiction reacts to a tax rate change of (one of) its 
neighbours by changing another tax rate as Van Parys & Verbeke (2007) show.  Therefore we add 
both LITRN and LPTRN in both tax rate regressions. 
 
                                               
9  We calculate unweighted averages. For Flemish municipalities across the language boundary, only Flemish 
neighbours are taken into account. Therefore, Voeren that has no Flemish neighbours is removed from the 
dataset.  
10  Brueckner (2003) shows that the reaction functions to test each interaction model separately have the same form, so 
that it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to empirically verify which model is appropriate. 
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Whether or not the time to next elections has an impact on local tax rates is the subject of  
hypothesis 5. Following Ashworth et al. (2005 & 2006) we test this effect by TBE that takes into 
account the time before elections in years. TBE has value 5 in post-election years, 4 in the 
second year after the election and so on to end with value 0 in the election year. For our 
purpose, the idea is that local politicians, motivated by their chances of re-election, lower 
taxation before elections. As Ashworth et al. (2006) find non-linearities in the electoral cycle 
when analysing local public debt, we introduce both TBE and its squared term.  
 
To empirically test hypothesis 6 on fiscal illusion, we introduce ILLUS, a vector of fiscal illusion 
variables. Different types of fiscal illusion are distinguished. First, we test for the presence of a 
possible flypaper effect. As in Bastiaens et al. (2001), GRANT is defined as the unconditional 
grants per capita to capture a possible flypaper effect. As higher grants may obscure the real tax 
price of public goods, it may have a positive impact on the demand for public goods and thus 
on tax rates (to finance this increased demand). The presence of a flypaper effect should result 
in a positive value for GRANT. Second, we take into account the elasticity of the tax receipts 
by the variable TEL. Similar to Heyndels & Smolders (1994), we introduce the proportion of 
total tax revenue generated by the local income tax to capture a possible elasticity effect. TEL 
thus is calculated as (income tax revenues/total tax revenues). When no income taxes are levied, 
TEL has value 0. When only income taxes are levied, TEL has value 1. Should the elasticity of 
the tax receipts cause fiscal illusion, then we expect a positive value for TEL. More elastic tax 
revenues should increase spending and again this could have a positive impact on tax rates. 
Third, the complexity of the tax structure is measured by HHI. Following Wagner (1976) the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) is frequently used to measure the complexity of a 
jurisdiction‟s tax structure, as in, for example, Bastiaens et al. (2001), Dollery & Worthington 
(1999), Heyndels & Smolders (1994) and Misiolek & Elder (1988). The HHI is calculated as the 
sum of squared shares of the individual tax items ti in the total local tax revenues and varies 
between 0 and 1. Municipalities relying on just one tax source have index 1. The more taxes a 
government levies and the more the tax revenues are equal to each other, the lower the HHI-
value. Complex tax structures thus present low HHI-values. We expect that a more complex tax 
structure reduces the political cost of raising local tax rates and induces higher tax rates, 
resulting therefore in a negative value. Finally, to measure a renter illusion effect, the percentage 
of residences that are non-owner-occupied (RENT) may be introduced in the LPTR 
estimation.11 Renters underestimate their true tax price and therefore accept more easily higher 
                                               
11  We only test the renter illusion hypothesis for the LPTR as LITR is not a property based tax. 
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levels of local expenditure (Blom-Hansen, 2005) that for their part lead to higher levels of tax 
rates. A positive coefficient thus is expected. 
 
Next we introduce the tax rate of the other tax as well as socio-economic, demographic and 
budgetary determinants as control variables in our model. The introduction of the other tax rate 
controls for the interdependence of different tax instruments. Hettich & Winer (1988) show that 
political-cost-minimizing politicians diversify taxes. In these models municipalities are assumed to 
use different taxes up to the point where marginal political costs are equated for all taxes. If so, an 
increase in the political cost of raising one particular tax rate prompts an adjustment in the other 
tax rate(s). Therefore we introduce, as do Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998), the level of LITR in the 
LPTR estimation and vice versa. DEMO is a vector of demographic and socio-economic variables 
controlling for intermunicipal differences in preferences for local public services. The size of the 
municipality (POP), the share of young (YOUNG) and old people (OLD) and the rate of 
unemployment (UNEMPL) reflect the needs for general and specific public services respectively.12 
Positive coefficients are expected. Revenue-generating characteristics refer to the capability of the 
government to collect revenues. Tax rates depend in the first place on the tax base yield (TBASE). 
For the local income tax rate, TBASE is measured as the tax revenue per capita of one percent 
local income tax. This measure is preferred to the average income per capita since it takes into 
account the progressiveness of the federal income tax (Van Parys & Verbeke, 2007). To capture 
the local property tax base we use the tax revenue per capita of one percent (this equals 100 
centimes) local property tax. If TBASE represents the capability of the government to collect 
revenues, a negative sign for TBASE can be expected. Indeed, a higher tax base allows lower tax 
rates for a given level of tax revenues. Still the tax base may also represent the demand for public 
goods and services. The idea here is that the demand for public goods and services increases with 
income, requiring additional financial resources, leading to higher tax rates. The sign of TBASE 
thus is a priori unknown. Second, tax rates also depend on the availability of alternative revenue 
sources (Hettich & Winer, 1999). The more a government depends on its tax revenues, the higher 
the tax rates are expected (TDEP). In the LITR (LPTR) estimation, TDEP is constructed as the 
part of local income (property) tax revenues in total revenues. Also the level of debt (DEBT, debts 
per capita in €1000) can be of importance for fiscal policy. If a jurisdiction is confronted with 
higher levels of debt, higher tax rates can be expected given the resulting interest and amortization 
                                               
12  POP is measured as the number of inhabitants. YOUNG and OLD are calculated as the percentage of inhabitants 
that are below 20 and over 64 respectively. UNEMPL is the percentage of inhabitants that are unemployed. 
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payments. The inclusion of a linearly increasing trend variable (TREND) accounts for the (slight) 
upward trend in the dependent variables. 
 
Following Solé Ollé (2003) and Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998), we lagged the political, the 
demographic, the tax base and the debt variables one year because tax rates are set ex ante. 
They are fixed in the autumn of the previous year. GRANT, on the other hand, is not lagged 
because governments know in advance the level of grants they will receive in the next fiscal 
year. No lags were introduced for the interaction variables because municipalities do not have 
to wait a year to observe the tax rates of neighbouring municipalities.13  
 
Table A4 in appendix on p. 24 shows some descriptive statistics concerning both the dependent 
and the explanatory variables. 
 
4.4 Methodology  
 
We construct a panel data model (1992-2006) that regresses simultaneously LPTR and LITR on 
various local characteristics that, according to the theoretical expectations, may influence the tax 
rates. Some of these characteristics open up a discussion concerning some challenging 
econometric issues. 
 
First we are confronted with a “between municipalities” simultaneity problem. To measure for 
the impact of yardstick competition, neighbours‟ tax rates are introduced in the regression. 
These tax rates are supposed to be endogenous. The tax rate in municipality i depends on that 
in municipality j, but also vice versa. This introduces a specific simultaneity problem, which is 
well established in the spatial econometrics literature (Cliff & Ord, 1973). In general the 
presence of endogenous regressors at the right-hand side of the equation leads to biased OLS 
estimates. Following Besley & Case (1995), Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998), Brett & Pinkse 
(2000), Buettner (2001) and Solé Ollé (2003), we adopt an instrumental variables (IV) approach 
that controls for additional spatial auto-correlation of residuals, as demonstrated by Kelejian & 
Pruncha (1998). Like Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998), we introduce the neighbouring 
municipality‟s average income, its population size, its percentages of people under 20 and over 
64 years and its average tax rates over the past 5 years as instruments in the model.  
                                               
13  The setting of tax rates provokes a lot of public discussion. Council meetings –where these tax rates are discussed– 
are open to the public and politicians from neighbouring municipalities often meet so they are likely to be aware of 
tax rates in neighbouring municipalities and thus can react immediately. A similar assumption is made for Flemish 
municipalities in Geys (2006) and Werck et al. (2008), but also in Buettner (2001) for German local governments. 
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Second, the government decides on both LPTR and LITR in the same period and within the 
same (economic, political as social) context. Therefore the error term of the LPTR estimation 
could be correlated with the error term of the LITR estimation. We thus are confronted with a 
“within municipality” simultaneity problem. Traditionally, Zellner‟s Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) method is then suggested. This method permits to control for possible 
interaction effects in the setting of both tax rates. This interaction is not unlikely as Hettich & 
Winer (1988) state that municipalities use different taxes up to the point where marginal political 
costs are equated for all taxes. If so, an increase in the political cost of increasing one particular 
tax rate prompts an adjustment in the other tax rates. Therefore we introduce for the LPTR 
equation LITR as explanatory variable (and vice versa, see supra). To take into account 
econometrically the fact that governments consider all tax rates when setting each one 
individually, a simultaneous setting should be estimated. We thus have to construct a system that 
represents a tax structure of which both tax rates are part. Like Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998) we 
introduce a pooled three-stages least squares (3SLS) estimation. While two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) solve the “between municipalities” simultaneity problem, 3SLS allow cross-correlation 
between the equations and thus also solve the “within municipality” simultaneity problem. In 
fact 3SLS is a combination of 2SLS and SUR (Zellner & Theil, 1962). The 3SLS procedure 
allows for the interaction between the settings of these separate taxes. The 3SLS technique 
estimates both regressions simultaneously and corrects for the possible simultaneity of the left-
hand-side variables. Although time-series datasets are sensitive to serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity, the 3SLS estimation technique presents consistent estimates despite the 
possible existence of these features (Wooldridge, 2002).  
 
4.5 Results 
 
We present several sets of regression results in Table 1. The most general estimations in 
columns (1) and (2) include all the available explanatory variables. We then gradually eliminate 
the least significant variables until we obtain models with only statistically significant at least at 
the 10% level coefficients in columns (3) and (4). In general, results match very well with the 
predicted effects. Most of the coefficients are significant and our model explains about 64% 
and 82% of the variance of LITR and LPTR respectively. In general the explanatory power of 
the presented models is much higher than previous research on LITR and LPTR in 
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Belgian/Flemish municipalities.14 It seems that both the length of our time series and the joint 
hypothesis test contributes to the higher explanatory power of the models.15 The adjusted R²s 
give no indication that regressors are added without contributing to the explanatory power of 
the model. Wald tests were performed and reject the null hypotheses that all slope coefficients 
of our analysis are equal to zero.  
 
                                               
14  The Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998) cross-section analysis on Belgian municipalities explains 15% of LITR and 44% 
of LPTR. The Bastiaens et al. (2001) cross-section analysis on Flemish municipalities explains 25% of LITR and 
36% of LPTR. Van Parys & Verbeke (2007) use panel-data of Belgian municipalities but do not present R² values.  
15  See also Table A3 on p. 23 in appendix where individual hypothesis-tests are presented. 
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Table 1 Estimation results of the 3SLS estimation 
 
Hyp. Dep. Var. 
           1             2            3             4  
LITRt  LPTRt  LITRt  LPTRt  
 
Intercept 
-1.975 
(-4.95) 
*** 
 
1976.526 
(8.61) 
*** -1.949 
(-4.89) 
*** 
 
2159.172 
(9.03) 
*** 
1 ICGt-1 
-0.037 
(-1.83) 
* 
 
12.699 
(2.92) 
*** -0.038 
(-1.88) 
* 
 
14.366 
(3.34) 
*** 
2 NPARt-1 
0.179 
(3.02) 
*** 
 
40.433 
(3.74) 
*** 0.180 
(3.04) 
*** 
 
39.534 
(3.55) 
*** 
 NPAR²t-1 
-0.046 
(-3.34) 
*** 
 
-6.004 
(-2.42) 
** -0.046 
(-3.35) 
*** 
 
-6.029 
(-2.34) 
** 
3 SEATMARt-1 
-0.305 
(-3.02) 
*** 
 
-0.127 
(-0.01) 
 -0.301 
(-2.98) 
*** 
 
-  
4 LITRNt 
0.301 
(6.96) 
*** 
 
-184.163 
(-4.95) 
*** 0.312 
(7.18) 
*** 
 
-211.912 
(-6.18) 
*** 
 LPTRNt 
-0.002 
(-9.32) 
*** 
 
0.386 
(7.57) 
*** -0.002 
(-9.57) 
*** 
 
0.423 
(9.11) 
*** 
5 TBEt 
0.121 
(5.42) 
*** 
 
29.695 
(6.61) 
*** 0.121 
(5.41) 
*** 
 
30.866 
(7.20) 
*** 
 TBE²t 
-0.024 
(-5.42) 
*** 
 
-4.374 
(-5.05) 
*** -0.023 
(-5.39) 
*** 
 
-4.580 
(-5.49) 
*** 
6.1 GRANTt 
0.001 
(1.79) 
* 
 
0.525 
(7.09) 
*** 
 
0.001 
(1.88) 
* 
 
0.555 
(7.14) 
*** 
6.2 TELt 
5.606 
(30.41) 
*** 
 
-1815.124 
(-45.23) 
*** 5.596 
(30.35) 
*** 
 
-1810.328 
(-47.93) 
*** 
6.3 HHIt 
-2.849 
(-13.41) 
*** 
 
290.581 
(6.08) 
*** -2.870 
(-13.51) 
*** 
 
307.768 
(6.91) 
*** 
6.4 RENTt -  
2.067 
(5.65) 
*** 
-  
2.030 
(5.51) 
*** 
 
LITRt -  
93.511 
(31.34) 
*** 
-  
95.146 
(29.96) 
*** 
 
LPTRt 
0.002 
(32.68) 
*** 
 
- 
 0.002 
(32.79) 
*** 
 
- 
 
 
OLDt-1 
5.567 
(7.82) 
*** 
 
597.591 
(4.11) 
*** 5.560 
(7.82) 
*** 
 
513.211 
(3.15) 
*** 
 
YOUNGt-1 
7.109 
(9.02) 
*** 
 
-1267.420 
(-5.15) 
*** 7.067 
(8.97) 
*** 
 
-1444.606 
(-5.49) 
*** 
 
UNEMPLt-1 
4.782 
(3.13) 
*** 
 
-29.458 
(-0.09) 
 4.102 
(2.67) 
*** 
 
-  
 
POPt-1 
4.34E-06 
(5.94) 
*** 
 
-0.001 
(-6.38) 
*** 4.29E-05 
(5.87) 
*** 
 
-0.001 
(-6.74) 
*** 
 
TBASEt-1 
-0.075 
(-22.02) 
*** 
 
-35.481 
(-56.65) 
*** -0.075 
(-22.18) 
*** 
 
-35.6257 
(-54.70) 
*** 
 
TDEPt-1 
5.173 
(17.47) 
*** 
 
1119.320 
(18.25) 
*** 5.157 
(17.41) 
*** 
 
1117.516 
(18.31) 
*** 
 
DEBTt-1 
0.180 
(5.99) 
*** 
 
96.508 
(16.30) 
*** 0.180 
(6.01) 
*** 
 
94.707 
(15.38) 
*** 
 
TRENDt 
0.106 
(17.08) 
*** 
 
21.370 
(27.02) 
*** 0.107 
(17.20) 
*** 
 
21.241 
(25.75) 
*** 
 R² 0.644  0.834  0.642  0.820  
 Adjusted R² 0.642  0.833  0.640  0.819  
 Wald F-stat (p) 1221868 (p<0.01) 11808115 (p<0.01) 
Note: N=4521, t-values between brackets (except for Wald-test where p is presented); * significant at 10%, 
** at 5% and *** at 1%. Wald statistic has a Chi² distribution with R degrees of freedom (R being the 
number of estimated parameters).  
 
We discuss the results hypothesis by hypothesis. As to  hypothesis 1 on partisan politics, we find 
significant coefficients for ICG. Partisan politics have a significant impact on both LITR and 
LPTR. In line with the expectations, ICG presents a negative coefficient in the LITR estimation. 
Leftist governments levy higher LITR and support hypothesis 1. In the LPTR estimation, against 
the expectations, the coefficient is positive. Leftist governments impose lower LPTR. The results 
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of the ICG variable show that leftist governments tend towards high income tax rates, while they 
prefer low property tax rates. This is in line with the general idea that left-wing governments rely 
more heavily on the taxation of personal income as they favour the progressivity of tax 
schedules16 –as in the federal income tax on which the local income tax is a surcharge (see for 
example Cusack & Beramendi, 2006 and Imbeau et al., 2001). As the local property tax in Flemish 
municipalities lacks progressivity, this might explain why leftist governments rely more on income 
taxes.  
 
Table 1 shows that fragmentation (hypothesis 2) affects fiscal policy in Flemish municipalities. As in 
Ashworth & Heyndels (2005), Ashworth et al. (2005 & 2006), Geys (2007) and Goeminne et al. 
(2008), the effect of fragmentation on tax rate policy is not linear. Not only NPAR, but also 
NPAR² shows significant coefficients for both tax rates. Table A5 on p. 24 in appendix shows 
that tax rates first increase with the level of fragmentation, then they decrease. Highest tax rates 
are observed in governments with 2 and 3 parties for LITR and LPTR respectively. The impact of 
fragmentation on tax rates thus is concave. Indeed, broad-based coalitions are more likely to 
follow fiscal policies acceptable  for a larger part of the population (see e.g. Lijphart & Crepaz, 
1991). These broad-based coalitions might be less prone to threats of minor interest groups, 
limiting increases in expenditures and thereby the need to set higher tax rates.   
 
With respect to hypothesis 3 the expectation was that stronger majorities would be less liable to 
opportunistic fiscal behavior as they are relatively confident about re-election, regardless of their 
tax setting. The SEATMAR coefficient is only significant in the LITR estimation. Its sign suggests 
that more powerful governments levy lower LITR. Although contrary to the expectations, this 
result may not be that surprising. A stronger majority may indeed be less liable to opportunistic 
behavior without this automatically leading to higher tax rates. On the contrary, good vote 
perspectives may create a working environment in which a government is able to focus only on 
the needs of the municipality independent of possible opportunistic or strategic motivations. This 
may lead to lower tax rates. Indeed, a strong government may more easily reduce spending 
(Volkerink & de Haan, 1999). There is for example no need to gain additional votes by increasing 
expenditures or developing impressive (and costly) investment projects. Instead, the government 
can develop long-term planning with a staggering of investments over different terms, tax rates 
need not be increased after elections to permit tax decreases in election years, and so on. 
Governments that are more confident about re-election are thus not (or less) tempted to act 
                                               
16  Wilensky (2002; 235) explicitely states that “especially progressive income taxes are the favourites of leftist parties 
everywhere”. 
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opportunistically and are able to focus on the good governance of the municipality. This may lead 
to more efficient governments, resulting in lower tax rates. There is no indication that the power 
of the government explains LPTR. 
 
Hypothesis 4 was related to the impact of neighbouring municipalities‟ fiscal policy decisions. The 
results show that tax rates depend on those of neighbouring municipalities both in within- and 
cross-policy approaches. First, there is evidence that “within policy interaction” effects are 
present. The results provide support for the yardstick competition hypothesis. The coefficients 
indicate that governments whose neighbours increase their average income (property) tax rate by 
1% (100 centimes) will also increase the LITR (LPTR) by 0.312% (42 centimes). The tax rate of 
the neighbouring municipalities thus are used as a yardstick, still their effect is partial. Second, 
results in Table 1 show that there is not only evidence of within-policy interaction, but also offer 
evidence of “cross-policy interaction”. LITR is not only defined by the level of LITRN, but also 
by the level of LPTRN. An increase of LPTRN by 100 centimes reduces LITR by 0.2%. The 
same is true for LPTR. Here an increase of LITRN by 1% reduces LPTR by 212 centimes. 
Taking the within- and cross-policy interaction effects together a change of LITRN by 1% 
changes LITR by 0.312% in the same and LPTR by 212 centimes in the opposite direction a 
change in the average neighbouring local income tax rate is thus only partly compensated for. The 
same conclusion can be drawn for changes in the LPTRN a change of LPTRN by 100 centimes 
changes LPTR by 42 centimes in the same and LITR by 0.2% in the opposite direction.  
 
There is evidence that confirms hypothesis 5 for both tax rates. In line with the expectations, we 
find that governments impose lower tax rates in election years and that they increase tax rates 
once elections have taken place. The electoral cycle variables present a non-linear path of fiscal 
policy variables. This is in line with a standard finding in the public choice literature (Imbeau & 
Chenard, 2002). Both the LITR and LPTR increase once elections took place. The highest tax 
rates are observed 3 years before elections. Then, LITR is 0.15% higher than in election years, 
while LPTR is 51 centimes higher. When elections come near tax rates reduce to present the 
lowest level over the electoral cycle in the election years.17  
 
Table 1 provides evidence that allows to confirm hypothesis 6 on fiscal illusion, still the results are 
not univocal. First we discuss the results for the LITR. Here, all three tested hypotheses could 
                                               
17  The joint impact of TBE and TBE² on LITR and LPTR for all years of the electoral cycle is presented in Table A6 
on p. 25 in appendix. 
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be confirmed.18 We find significant coefficients that have the expected signs and may conclude 
that in Flemish local governments LITR “suffers” from fiscal illusion. The higher the grant 
revenue, the more complex the tax system and the more a government depends on income 
taxes, the higher LITR. For LPTR, there is evidence that confirms the existence of grant 
illusion and of renter illusion. As Heyndels & Smolders (1994) and Van Parys & Verbeke (2007) 
we find that higher grants may obscure the real tax price of public goods leading to an increase 
in the demand for public goods with a higher LPTR as consequence. Contrary to Ashworth & 
Heyndels (1997), Heyndels & Smolders (1994) and Schockaert (1987) we do find empirical 
evidence for renter illusion in Flemish municipalities. A higher percentage of renters in the 
municipality pushes the LPTR up. As Bastiaens et al. (2001) we only find support for tax the 
complexity hypothesis for LITR. If the complexity of the tax system has no illusionary effects 
on LPTR, HHI represents the spread of tax revenues over the different taxes. The more 
different taxes a government levies, the lower the average revenues per tax it needs to collect 
the needed total tax revenues. Therefore governments with a higher number of taxes are able to 
set lower LPTR. Or, when the total tax revenues can be spread over more taxes, LPTR 
decreases. Finally, the sign of TEL is negative, suggesting that there is no evidence that a higher 
elasticity of the tax revenues increases LPTR. On the contrary, the negative sign points to a 
lower LPTR with high tax elasticity. This may suggest that in the LPTR estimation TEL suffers 
from a “tax dependence bias”. The higher the percentage of local income tax revenues in total 
tax revenues, the less it is dependent on those of local property tax, so the less need to set high 
LPTR. This is in line with the positive sign of control variable TDEP in the LPTR estimation 
and the positive sign of TEL in the LITR estimation.  
 
One of the contributions of this analysis is that the findings on the different hypothesis-tests 
result from a joint analysis. Nevertheless, we also present in Table A3 on p. 23 in appendix as 
a kind of sensitivity analysis results from individual tests of the different hypotheses (we restrict 
to the most efficient regressions). We do not intend to discuss the results of the individual 
analysis in detail, still a clear observer may conclude that the joint model not only presents 
increased explanatory power, it also shows that the power and signs of the estimators differ –
especially for LPTR– and thus lead to modified and even opposite findings. This indicates that 
former research based on separate analyses may be misspecified. 
 
Finally, some general findings on the control variables. In line with the Hettich & Winer tax model 
                                               
18  Remind that in the LITR the renter illusion hypothesis is not tested as LITR is not a property based tax. 
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and the Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998) findings, we find that municipalities have coherent tax 
policies in that the level of LITR is significantly and positively affected by the level of LPTR (and 
vice versa) in each model. Next the variables reflecting the needs for general and specific local 
public services are discussed. POP, OLD, YOUNG and UNEMPL all affect the LITR in a 
significantly positive way. This is in line with the expectations. We cannot find a similar effect on 
the LPTR estimation. The results show that both larger and younger municipalities have lower 
LPTR and that the unemployment rate does not affect LPTR. The latter may be not that 
surprising as unemployment policy is in fact in the hands of the federal and regional government. 
The cost of unemployment thus is particularly defrayed by higher governments. TBASE presents 
significant negative coefficients in both regressions and thus represents the capability of the 
government to collect revenues. A higher tax base allows lower tax rates for a given level of tax 
revenues. TDEP, DEBT and TREND finally have significant coefficients in both regressions, 
each time with the expected positive signs. First, the more a government depends on a certain 
tax, the higher the rates. Second, higher levels of debt may lead to higher interest payments and 
higher tax rates. Finally, the slight positive trend in the dependent variables is taken into account 
in the significant positive coefficient of TREND.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper was to bring together different explanations for local tax rate policy 
in one single estimation model, using an extended dataset. Based on a large literature on tax rate 
determinants, we formulated hypotheses to test the presence of partisan effects, fragmentation 
effects, interaction dynamics, electoral cycles and fiscal illusion effects. We construct an 
estimation model in which we integrate all the variables simultaneously. As in reality we expect  
these specific effects to explain the Flemish local income and local property tax rates 
contemporaneously. Results indicate that for both taxes partisan effects are important. 
Although the effect is not linear, also the level of fragmentation affects the tax rates. The 
strength of the government is decisive for LITR and allows to conclude that strong 
governments may increase efficiency leading to lower LITR. Interaction effects and political 
budget cycles are observed for both tax rates. LITR suffers from fiscal illusion as all three tested  
hypotheses can be confirmed. For LPTR only grant illusion and renter illusion can be 
confirmed. The main contribution of this paper is that the results above result from a model 
that attempts to test the joint impact of these theories. We are aware of the fact that the 
development of a comprehensive tax choice model is a task that is beyond the reach of this 
paper and it was not our intention to create a global model. It has, however, been shown that, 
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although largely described in significant models individually, theories on fiscal policy need to be 
studied and interpreted simultaneously to avoid misspecification.   
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Appendices 
 
Table A1 Size of the College of Mayor and Alderman in Flanders (N=308) 
 
 
 1989-1994 1995-2000 2001-2006 
1 party 140 (45.5%) 120 (39.0%) 96 (31.2%) 
2 parties 136 (44.8%) 149 (48.4%) 162 (52.6%) 
3 parties 27 (8.8%) 31 (10.1%) 43 (14.0%) 
+ 3 parties 5 (1.6%) 8 (2.6%) 7 (2.3%) 
Average number of parties 1.67 1.77 1.87 
 
Source : Ashworth et al. (2005, 400) 
 
 
Table A2 Ideological positions of Flemish parties 
 
General name 1989-1994 1995-2000 2001-2006 
Ecologists 2.9 2.6 2.6 
Socialists 2.8 2.7 2.8 
Nationalists 5.1 4.7 5.0 
Local parties 5.0 5.0 4.5 
Christian Democrats 5.1 5.3 5.3 
Liberals  5.6 6.1 6.0 
Extreme right - 8.9 8.7 
 
Source : Deschouwer (1996) & Rihoux (2001) 
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Table A3 Estimation results of the 3SLS estimation – individual hypothesis (columns 1-12) and joint hypotheses tests (columns 13-14) 
 
Hypothesis H1 on partisan politics H2 on fragmentation H3 on government strength H4 on policy interaction H5 on electoral cycles H6 on fiscal illusion Joint hypotheses tests 
Dep. Var. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  
LITRt  LPTRt  LITRt  LPTRt  LITRt  LPTRt  LITRt  LPTRt  LITRt  LPTRt  LITRt  LPTRt  LITRt  LPTRt  
Intercept 
3.110 
(19.61) 
*** 
 
-895.293 
(-12.32) 
*** 
 
2.744 
(22.41) 
*** 
 
-931.584 
(-12.78) 
*** 2.821 
(23.76) 
*** 
 
-993.055 
(-14.28) 
*** 
 
0.337 
(0.77) 
 
374.616 
(2.58) 
*** 
 
2.562 
(20.97) 
*** 
 
-1079.696 
(-15.64) 
*** 
 
-0.844 
(-2.68) 
*** 
 
1230.627 
(22.14) 
*** -1.949 
(-4.89) 
*** 
 
2159.172 
(9.03) 
*** 
ICGt-1 
-0.084 
(-3.72) 
*** 
 
-23.038 
(-4.57) 
*** 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 -0.038 
(-1.88) 
* 
 
14.366 
(3.34) 
*** 
NPARt-1 -  - 
 0.440 
(6.63) 
*** 
 
47.455 
(3.26) 
*** 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 0.180 
(3.04) 
*** 
 
39.534 
(3.55) 
*** 
NPAR²t-1 -  - 
 -0.103 
(-6.65) 
*** 
 
-9.033 
(-2.66) 
*** 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 -0.046 
(-3.35) 
*** 
 
-6.029 
(-2.34) 
** 
SEATMARt-1 -  - 
 
- 
 
- 
 -0.580 
(-5.16) 
*** 
 
-49.658 
(-1.99) 
** 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 -0.301 
(-2.98) 
*** 
 
-  
LITRNt -  - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 0.520 
(10.44) 
*** 
 
-197.483 
(-6.76) 
*** 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 0.312 
(7.18) 
*** 
 
-211.912 
(-6.18) 
*** 
LPTRNt -  - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 -0.003 
(-12.66) 
*** 
 
0.722 
(18.67) 
*** 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 -0.002 
(-9.57) 
*** 
 
0.423 
(9.11) 
*** 
TBEt -  - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 0.209 
(8.44) 
*** 
 
56.004 
(10.38) 
*** 
 
- 
 
- 
 0.121 
(5.41) 
*** 
 
30.866 
(7.20) 
*** 
TBE²t -  - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 -0.041 
(-8.53) 
*** 
 
-9.108 
(-8.60) 
*** 
 
- 
 
- 
 -0.023 
(-5.39) 
*** 
 
-4.580 
(-5.49) 
*** 
GRANTt -  - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 0.001 
(1.75) 
* 
 
0.393 
(6.72) 
*** 0.001 
(1.88) 
* 
 
0.555 
(7.14) 
*** 
TELt -  - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 6.386 
(36.47) 
*** 
 
-2064.691 
(-64.59) 
*** 5.596 
(30.35) 
*** 
 
-1810.328 
(-47.93) 
*** 
HHIt -  - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 -3.090 
(-15.11) 
*** 
 
102.096 
(2.82) 
*** -2.870 
(-13.51) 
*** 
 
307.768 
(6.91) 
*** 
RENTt -  - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-  
2.396 
(7.15) 
*** 
-  
2.030 
(5.51) 
*** 
LITRt -  
33.360 
(11.98) 
*** 
 
-  
33.408 
(12.13) 
*** 
-  
33.109 
(11.83) 
*** 
 
-  
46.896 
(15.37) 
*** 
 
-  
31.554 
(11.44) 
*** 
 
-  
90.112 
(42.10) 
*** 
-  
95.146 
(29.96) 
*** 
LPTRt 
0.001 
(22.58) 
*** 
 
- 
 0.001 
(22.83) 
*** 
 
- 
 0.001 
(22.75) 
*** 
 
-  
0.002 
(23.62) 
*** 
 
-  
0.001 
(21.49) 
*** 
 
-  
0.001 
(37.82) 
*** 
 
- 
 0.002 
(32.79) 
*** 
 
- 
 
OLDt-1 
-3.671 
(-6.77) 
*** 
 
3679.481 
(22.68) 
*** -4.115 
(-7.48) 
*** 
 
3395.719 
(20.22) 
*** -3.314 
(-6.10) 
*** 
 
3716.702 
(22.77) 
*** 
 
1.351 
(1.66) 
* 
 
1768.573 
(14.59) 
*** 
 
-3.268 
(-6.06) 
*** 
 
3734.786 
(23.30) 
*** 
 
3.082 
(4.64) 
*** 
 
1145.191 
(9.78) 
*** 5.560 
(7.82) 
*** 
 
513.211 
(3.15) 
*** 
YOUNGt-1 -  
1456.678 
(7.68) 
*** 
 
-  
1372.371 
(7.16) 
*** 
-  
1412.294 
(7.44) 
*** 
 
3.304 
(3.68) 
*** 
 
-  -  
1449.908 
(7.74) 
*** 
 
5.361 
(7.13) 
*** 
 
-436.779 
(-3.37) 
*** 7.067 
(8.97) 
*** 
 
-1444.606 
(-5.49) 
*** 
UNEMPLt-1 
15.563 
(11.23) 
*** 
 
5465.959 
(18.49) 
*** 14.079 
(10.41) 
*** 
 
5160.185 
(18.56) 
*** 16.500 
(12.01) 
*** 
 
5651.134 
(19.22) 
*** 
 
6.412 
(3.74) 
*** 
 
5462.185 
(17.76) 
*** 
 
17.313 
(12.62) 
*** 
 
5972.527 
(20.47) 
*** 
 
9.432 
(7.22) 
*** 
 
-1724.247 
(-7.66) 
*** 4.102 
(2.67) 
*** 
 
-  
POPt-1 
6.89E-05 
(15.77) 
*** 
 
0.001 
(7.78) 
*** 7.45E-06 
(16.08) 
*** 
 
0.001 
(8.26) 
*** 6.85E-06 
(15.69) 
*** 
 
0.001 
(7.95) 
*** 
 
5.41E-06 
(11.73) 
*** 
 
0.001 
(7.61) 
*** 
 
6.94E-06 
(16.02) 
*** 
 
0.001 
(8.15) 
*** 
 
5.10E-06 
(7.58) 
*** 
 
-0.001 
(-6.13) 
*** 4.29E-05 
(5.87) 
*** 
 
-0.001 
(-6.74) 
*** 
TBASEt-1 
-0.089 
(-28.93) 
*** 
 
-33.016 
(-50.21) 
*** -0.094 
(-28.05) 
*** 
 
-32.971 
(-46.81) 
*** -0.088 
(-28.52) 
*** 
 
-33.105 
(-50.26) 
*** 
 
-0.111 
(-29.91) 
*** 
 
-25.826 
(-33.52) 
*** 
 
-0.093 
(-29.97) 
*** 
 
-33.275 
(-51.18) 
*** 
 
-0.058 
(-20.97) 
*** 
 
-36.706 
(-76.93) 
*** -0.075 
(-22.18) 
*** 
 
-35.6257 
(-54.70) 
*** 
TDEPt-1 
12.011 
(55.51) 
*** 
 
3497.953 
(57.67) 
*** 11.553 
(53.52) 
*** 
 
3426.422 
(56.52) 
*** 11.965 
(55.40) 
*** 
 
3490.052 
(57.46) 
*** 
 
10.690 
(44.72) 
*** 
 
2743.662 
(43.77) 
*** 
 
12.179 
(56.35) 
*** 
 
3514.466 
(58.58) 
*** 
 
4.911 
(16.94) 
*** 
 
989.120 
(17.68) 
*** 5.157 
(17.41) 
*** 
 
1117.516 
(18.31) 
*** 
DEBTt-1 
0.073 
(2.22) 
** 
 
162.901 
(-21.51) 
*** 0.111 
(3.03) 
*** 
 
164.551 
(19.86) 
*** 0.067 
(2.02) 
** 
 
164.181 
(21.65) 
*** 
 
0.120 
(3.52) 
*** 
 
106.842 
(14.57) 
*** 
 
0.096 
(2.92) 
*** 
 
162.001 
(21.59) 
*** 
 
0.171 
(5.80) 
*** 
 
116.047 
(22.40) 
*** 0.180 
(6.01) 
*** 
 
94.707 
(15.38) 
*** 
TRENDt 
0.116 
(23.46) 
*** 
 
25.886 
(32.89) 
*** 0.111 
(21.17) 
*** 
 
23.854 
(30.81) 
*** 0.113 
(23.05) 
*** 
 
25.575 
(32.58) 
*** 
 
0.164 
(25.00) 
*** 
 
16.029 
(17.45) 
*** 
 
0.120 
(24.25) 
*** 
 
26.559 
(34.07) 
*** 
 
0.069 
(14.00) 
*** 
 
24.550 
(36.05) 
*** 0.107 
(17.20) 
*** 
 
21.241 
(25.75) 
*** 
R² 0.518  0.687  0.497  0.675  0.520  0.686  0.492  0.727  0.525  0.694  0.644  0.861  0.642  0.820  
Adjusted R² 0.517  0.686  0.496  0.675  0.519  0.685  0.491  0.726  0.524  0.693  0.643  0.861  0.640  0.819  
Wald test 490005 (p<0.01) 460426 (p<0.01) 490090 (p<0.01) 669797 (p<0.01) 494158 (p<0.01) 1180363 (p<0.01) 11808115 (p<0.01) 
N 4587 4563 4567 4553 4567 4539 4539 
Note: t-values between brackets (except for Wald-test where p is presented); * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Wald statistic has a Chi² distribution with R degrees of freedom (R being the number of estimated 
parameters).  
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Table A4 Descriptive statistics of the variables of the tax rate functions and data sources (1992-2006) 
 
 Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Source 
Local income tax rate (LITR t) 6.82 7.00 9.50 0.00 1.17 VVSG19 
Local property tax rate (LPTR t) 1127.73 1125.00 2300.00 260.00 319.22 VVSG 
Ideological Complexion of the Government (ICGt-1) 4.90 5.10 6.10 2.70 0.54 MICE, VUB20 
Actual number of government parties (NPARt-1) 1.78 2.00 5.00 1.00 0.73 MICE, VUB 
Average LITR of neighbouring municipalities 
(LITRNt) 
6.95 6.90 9.00 5.23 0.54 
VVSG, matrix of 
MICE, VUB 
Average LPTR of neighbouring municipalities 
(LPTRNt) 
1131.73 1112.50 1979.17 450.00 251.43 
VVSG, matrix of 
MICE, VUB 
Time before elections (TBEt) 2.20 2.00 5.00 0.00 1.69 - 
Grants (p/c) (GRANTt )  116.47 96.60 976.89 60.32 68.41 MICE, VUB 
Tax elasticity (TELt) 0.53 0.55 0.99 0.00 0.11 MICE, VUB 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHIt) 0.37 0.37 1.13 0.09 0.06 Own calcul. on AHA21 
Percentage of non-owner occupied residences 
(RENTt) 
25.19 23.72 53.78 8.31 7.30 AHAEconomy 
Number of inhabitants (POPt-1) 19186.20 13295.00 467518.00 84.00 30952.38 FPS Economy22 
Proportion of young (YOUNGt-1) 0.24 0.24 0.32 0.15 0.02 FPS Economy 
Proportion of elderly (OLDt-1) 0.16 0.16 0.26 0.07 0.03 FPS Economy 
Unemployment rate (UNEMPLt-1) 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.01 CORE, UCL23 
LIT tax base (TBASELITt-1) 25.11 24.04 55.69 1.23 7.57 AHA 
LPT tax base (TBASELPTt-1) 14.30 12.62 54.30 3.70 6.28 AHA 
Tax dependence LIT (TDEPLITt-1) 0.23 0.24 0.58 0.00 0.07 AHA 
Tax dependence LPT (TDEPLPTt-1) 0.20 0.20 0.55 0.05 0.06 AHA 
Debt (p/c in 1000€) (DEBTt-1) 0.91 0.84 4.00 0.00 0.44 MICE, VUB 
 
Table A5 Joint impact of NPAR and NPAR² on the evolution of LITR and LPTR 
 
Number of 
government 
parties 
LITR LPTR 
1 0.1340 33.5046 
2 0.1763 54.9512 
3 0.1269 64.3397 
4 -0.0142 61.6701 
5 -0.2470 46.9424 
 
                                               
19  “Vereniging Vlaamse Steden en Gemeenten”, the Association of Flemish Cities and Municipalities. 
20  MICE (Micro-Economics for Profit and Non Profit Sector) research team of the Faculty of Economic, Social and 
Political Sciences, and Solvay Business School, Vrije Universiteit Brussel. 
21  Agency for Home Affairs of the Flemish Government . 
22  Belgian Federal Public Service Economy, SME, Independent Professions and Energy. 
23  CORE (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics), Université catholique de Louvain. 
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Table A6 Joint impact of TBE and TBE² on the evolution of LITR and LPTR in non-election years 
compared to the tax rate in election years 
 
Years before 
elections 
LITR LPTR 
5 0.0155 39.8272 
4 0.1064 50.1819 
3 0.1503 51.3766 
2 0.1472 43.4112 
1 0.0971 26.2856 
0 0.0000 0.0000 
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